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The Tension Between Rules 
and Discretion in Family Law: 
A Report and Reflection 
CARL E. SCHNEIDER* 
I. Introduction 
The history of law is many things. But one of them is the story 
of an unremitting struggle between rules and discretion. 1 The tension 
between these two approaches to legal problems continues to pervade 
and perplex the law today. Perhaps nowhere is that tension more pro-
nounced and more troubling than in family law. It is probably impossible 
to practice family law without wrestling with the imponderable choice 
between rules and discretion. 
Consider, for example, how many areas of family law are now being 
fought over in-just those terms. For decades we have lived with an 
abundantly discretionary way of resolving child-custody disputes: The 
best-interests-of-the-child standard has long been understood to give 
judges acres of room to roam. Yet in recent years scholar after scholar 
has inveighed against the discretionary scope that standard permits 
judges, and jurisdiction after jurisdiction has adopted one or another 
standard-the primary caretaker presumption or joint custody, for in-
*For the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chicago 
L Rev 1343 (1986), I use the University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation (Lawyers 
Co-operative, 1989). 
1. A recent and rich examination of that struggle is Keith Hawkins, ed., The Uses 
of Discretion (Oxford U Press, 1992). My own attempt to examine systematically the 
analytic components of the struggle (Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View) is to be 
found in that volume. Other recent works on discretion include Aharon Barak, Judicial 
Discretion (Yale U Press, 1989); D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study 
of Official Discretion (Oxford U Press, 1990). A particularly useful recent study of 
rules in law is Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination 
of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford U Press, 1991). 
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stance-intended to cabin, crib, and confine the range of judicial discre-
tion.2 
Judicial discretion has also been the target of recent reforms in the 
law of child support. As social determination to charge fathers with the 
costs of rearing their children has intensified, so has dissatisfaction with 
the way judges have exercised their very considerable discretion in 
setting child support obligations. This dissatisfaction has resulted in 
federal requirements that states substitute relatively mechanical and 
limiting "guidelines" for judicial discretion. 
Judicial discretion has not been the only target of attack. Unhappiness 
with the way police and prosecutors have exercised their freedom in 
deciding how to respond to spouse abuse has similarly been assailed. 
This assault has led to rules which require police to arrest spouse abusers 
when specified criteria are met and which oblige prosecutors to prose-
cute with unaccustomed regularity. 
In the area of child abuse and neglect we may observe an equally 
fervent criticism of discretion, albeit one that leads to less prosecution 
rather than more. In this area, the doubters of discretion have argued 
that open-ended statutes have given social workers, police, prosecutors, 
and courts too broad a power to intrude on families. In consequence, 
the doubters say, intervention is all too likely where it is not justified 
and even where it will harm more than help. These arguments have 
helped inspire a movement toward statutes which define child abuse 
much more precisely and particularly than before and which thus seek 
to limit the discretion of officials to intervene in the lives of parents and 
children.3 
But not all modem family law describes a movement from discretion 
to rules. For decades-for centuries-American divorce courts have 
divided marital property according to two rule-based systems-the 
community-property and the common-law regimes. Over time, each 
system became increasingly elaborate, formalized, and rule-bound. In 
the last few years, these defects have helped impel many states to adopt 
an unashamedly discretionary substitute-the equitable-distribution 
principle. 
Indeed, a number of recent reforms in family law have enlarged 
the scope of judicial discretion (although that was not their immediate 
2. For a survey and criticism of those critics and a cautious defense of discretion 
in the law of child custody, see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child 
Custody and the UMDA 's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MichL Rev 2215 (1991). 
3. A particularly clear example of this trend is Juvenile Justice Standards Project, 
Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Standards Relating 
to Abuse and Neglect (1981). 
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purpose). For instance, courts are increasingly willing to enforce vari-
ous kinds of premarital contracts and contracts between unmarried 
cohabitants. This reform has heightened the ability of couples to orga-
nize their own affairs in legally binding ways. But it has also given 
courts new kinds of discretion-discretion to choose which contracts to 
enforce, to evaluate the conscionability of contracts, and to determine 
how to interpret them. Similarly, courts are now assuming broader 
discretion than ever before to decide when a group of people is a ''fam-
ily" and what legal consequences that conclusion ought to have. 
In short, family law has recently been roiled by much debate and 
many changes in which the contest between rules and discretion features 
centrally. This contest is hardly resolved. Every day lawyers argue in 
courts and legislatures around the country about whether a judge may 
and should exercise discretion, about whether a court should adopt a 
discretion-limiting rule, about whether a legislature should preempt 
judicial discretion by devising authoritative standards. 
So pressing do this subject and these controversies continue to be that 
at the conference on "Family Law for the Next Century," they were 
one of the three principal subjects for consideration among the academ-
ics and practicing lawyers who met for discussion. The conferees were 
asked to try to analyze systematically the advantages and drawbacks of 
both rules and discretion in the family law setting. They were also asked 
to investigate whether there is an optimal mix of rules and discretion 
in family law. This essay reports and reflects on their deliberations. 
Before turning to the substance of my report, I should acknowledge 
the difficulty of recording and recounting the intricate and stimulating 
conversations that flowed during the nine hours devoted to the topic of 
rules and discretion. The conferees disagreed freely, frequently, and 
even fiercely .4 While they often strove to reach a consensus, and while 
they sometimes seemed to have succeeded, the consensus was com-
monly fragile. It quickly cracked and crumbled when further discus-
sions forced the conferees to discover that their agreement was purely 
semantic, that their concord was merely superficial.5 
But this inability to reach a stable consensus was not, I think, fortu-
itous. Rather, it arose from the hard fact that the choice between discre-
4. Interestingly, disagreements did not develop neatly along the divide between 
academics and practitioners. The practitioners were perhaps likelier to find attractions 
in discretion and to fear the bureaucratization of family law; the academics were perhaps 
likelier to cite empirical studies and deplore their scarcity. But ultimately and notably, 
academics and practitioners were united by a sense of the complexity and recalcitrance 
of the problem of discretion and rules. 
5. For similar conclusions, see Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibilities for 
Extended Family Members?, 27 FAM. L. Q. 191, 211 (1993). 
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tion and rules must be a difficult one. Both rules and discretion have 
numerous and elaborately interacting benefits and burdens, so that when 
we walk toward one blessing we walk away from another. And the 
balance of advantage will slide and shift depending on the specific 
situation in which the choice is posed. Thus the choice between discre-
tion and rules will irredeemably be complex and uncertain and ''will 
depend on factors that will be difficult to assess and that will vary from 
circumstance to circumstance (so that it is not unreasonable for lawyers 
to look to particular contexts in evaluating discretion and rules). " 6 
II. Detlning Discretion 
As they began to debate the relative merits of rules and discretion, the 
conferees quickly realized that the legal system rarely if ever presents a 
plain choice between "rules" on one hand and "discretion" on the 
other. Rather, there is a continuum between rules and discretion, and 
most, if not all, legal regimes fall somewhere along, and not on the ends 
of, the continuum. 
On one end of the continuum, of course, are rules. But rules them-
selves come in varying strengths. Indeed, it is surprisingly difficult to 
state a rule for an important subject that leaves no room for interpretation 
at least on its margins. Toward the "rule" end of the continuum are 
a series of devices that are intended to limit decision-makers but that 
are less directive than rules. These include the principles, policies, 
guidelines, presumptions, and lists of factors in which family law 
abounds. 
At the other end of the continuum is discretion. But discretion too 
comes in strong and weak forms. Professor Dworkin, one of the most 
influential writers on discretion, says that a person has discretion in the 
strong form "when he is simply not bound by standards set by the 
authority in question. " 7 Professor Dworkin identifies two "weak" 
forms of discretion: "Sometimes we use 'discretion' in a weak sense, 
simply to say that for some reason the standards an official must apply 
cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of judgment.' ' 8 The 
other weak sense refers to occasions when "some official has fmal 
authority to make a decision and cannot be reviewed and reversed by 
any other official. ' '9 
6. Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View, in Keith Hawkins, 
ed., The Uses of Discretion 49 (Oxford U Press, 1992) (Schneider, Discretion and 
Rules). 
7. Ronald Dworkin, Takings Rights Seriously § 32 (Harvard U Press, 1977). 
8. ld at 31. 
9. ld at 32. 
The Tension Between Rules and Discretion 233 
Further complicating the issue is the discovery that discretion comes 
in a smorgasbord of forms. There is, for instance, discretion to find 
facts, discretion to choose rules, discretion to make rules, discretion to 
interpret rules, and discretion to apply the rules to the facts. Further-
more, most legal regimes feature not just one of the approaches I listed, 
but rather a mix of them. In handling a single case, a judge may, 
for example, be governed by some rules, some principles, and some 
presumptions, and may be freed by several forms of discretion. So 
numerous, so inevitable, and so intertwined are these approaches that, 
even when you have a highly discretionary standard, there are con-
straints. And even when you have a highly rule-bound standard, there 
is room for manoeuver. 
The conferees rapidly identified another complicating feature of the 
tension between rules and discretion: Any regime's mix of rules and 
discretion is likely to be dynamic, to be unstable, to be in flux. For 
instance, if the balance tilts heavily toward the discretion end of the 
spectrum, rules often begin to emerge. Judges chafe under the burdens 
of discretion and informally begin to rely on rules of thumb. Those rules 
of thumb are gradually converted into formally expressed case law. The 
precedents of case law then begin to shape themselves into articulated 
rules. Legislatures in their tum sometimes convert those rules into 
statutory law. Thus is re-enacted the age-old common-law process. 
Nor are rules necessarily stable. Over time, a system of rules can 
become intolerably complex, rigid, and anachronistic. Courts struggle 
. to interpret such rules in ways that accommodate the terms of all the 
relevant rules, that accord with the applicable case law, and that accom-
plish justice. Those struggles cannot be wholly successful, and they 
produce yet more complicated-and inconsistent-rules. Eventually, 
the structure can collapse of its own weight. This may be part of what 
has happened to the traditional common-law and community-property 
systems for dividing marital assets on divorce. 
The instability of a pure system of rules has yet another source. The 
conferees widely believed that, if you try to squeeze off discretion in 
one place, it will simply ooze out again in another. This can happen in 
a variety of ways. Most blatantly, judges can simply choose to disregard 
the law. And given the deference appellate courts commonly concede 
to judges in many family law subjects, they may be able to get away 
with doing so. 
But the conferees generally felt this did not happen often. Rather, 
they believed that the complexity of family law decisions gives judges 
numerous straightforward ways to retrieve lost discretion. Suppose, for 
example, the legislature says to the judge, you must divide marital 
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property equally. The judge may conscientiously follow that directive, 
but devote new attention to the rewardingly discretionary question of 
how property should be defined. Or suppose that the legislature adopts 
child-support standards that deprive judges of their former authority in 
making child-support orders. Judges may respond by altering their 
alimony, marital-property, and attorney-fee awards to achieve the over-
all result that they believe just. 
The conferees were also impressed by another judicial tactic for 
preserving discretion. The trial court's power to find facts is not only 
enormously important. It is also authority quite lightly checked by 
appellate courts. Several conferees pointed to valuation questions as 
particularly crucial, complex, and baffling, and as ·thus permitting 
judges significant freedom whatever rule of law nominally governed 
their decisions. 
Nor is judicial discretion the only kind that can be hard to suppress. 
For example, litigants too exercise discretion. They are, after all, the 
ones who decide when to commence litigation, and they have the power 
to end it. One function of family law is to try to control when and why 
litigation is begun and halted. But the litigants are likely to be the players 
whose discretion may be hardest to control because their behavior is 
least susceptible to the law's incentives. As one conferee remarked, "It. 
doesn't matter what you call [your child-custody] rule, if the parties 
want to fight, they will. " 
In short, every regime will comprise a richly complex mixture of 
discretion and rules. And any regime's mixture will be kept unstable 
by many forces. The dynamics and demands oflaw as a system are one. 
The need of lawyers to locate arguments that will serve their clients' 
interests is another. The desire of judges for the authority to make wise 
decisions is yet a third. And brooding over all these are the broad social 
developments that change the context in which all the players work and 
the ways in which they think and act. 
ID. The Delights of Discretion 
What, then, are the attractions of discretion? Perhaps its leading 
virtue is that it gives a judge authority to respond to the full range of 
circumstances a case presents and thus to do justice in each individual 
case. The conferees agreed without noticeable dissent that the need for 
individualized justice in family law is particularly pressing. People 
organize and conduct their family lives in a burgeoning and bewildering 
variety of ways. And a court's resolution of a family dispute will matter 
The Tension Between Rules and Discretion 235 
to the parties more deeply and durably than in perhaps any other kind 
of civil litigation. 
Of course, even though family law disputes vary widely and matter 
greatly, the costs of individualized decisions might still outweigh their 
benefits. On this point, there may have been some difference between 
the practitioners and the academics. Practitioner after practitioner was 
eager to tell the story of a particularly meritorious-irresistibly appeal-
ing, even-client whose case would have been unjustly-outrageously, 
even-resolved had the judge lacked discretion to rise above a narrow 
interpretation of the applicable rule. The academics, on the other hand, 
were as a group inclined to think that these stories might be relatively 
rare exceptions. They suspected that most litigants might fall into a few 
identifiable categories. They were thus reluctant to foreswear rules. 
A number of the conferees saw another substantial merit in discretion. 
They pointed out that we seem to be undergoing a period of rapid social 
change in those parts oflife family law seeks to regulate. They observed 
that rules are intended to, and often do, change grudgingly and ponder-
ously. Discretion, on the other hand, allows the judge to respond expedi-
tiously to society's evolving preferences and practices. 
Flexibility, then, is the leading positive argument for discretion. But 
that argument can also be usefully put in a negative form: Discretion 
is necessary where no satisfactory rule can be written. Indeed, as I have 
suggested elsewhere, the three basic reasons in Western law for granting 
discretionary authority all arise out of problems in writing rules. What 
I call rule-failure discretion ''is created where it is believed that cases 
will arise in circumstances so varied, so complex, and so unpredictable 
that satisfactory rules that will accurately guide decision-makers to 
correct results in a sufficiently large number of cases cannot be writ-
ten.'' 10 The best-interest standard, among others, is readily understood 
and often explained in rule-failure terms. 
Also arising from problems writing rules is rule-building discretion. 
It is resorted to ''where the rule-maker could devise tolerably effective 
rules, but concludes that better rules would be developed (or that the 
same rules could be developed more efficiently) if the decision-makers 
were allowed to develop rules for themselves as they go along. " 11 This, 
of course, is the standard rationale for the common-law process. And 
it may well explain what is happening today in, for example, the field 
of marital contracts. 
10. Schneider, Discretion and Rules cited in note 6. 
11. Id at 64. 
236 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 27, Number 2, Summer 1993 
Finally, rule-compromise discretion has a similar source. It occurs 
where ''the members of the governmental body responsible for in-
structing the decision-maker cannot agree on rules or even guidelines, 
and . . . deliberately choose to pass responsibility on to the decision-
maker. " 12 The rule-compromise problem may well explain, for in-
stance, why legislatures have simply instructed courts to divide property 
"equitably" rather than specifying what "equitable" might mean. 
The conferees were far too burdened deciphering the larger issues 
of the tension between discretion and rules to try to show that satisfac-
tory rules could replace discretion in any area of family law. But occa-
sional disagreements on points of substance hinted that writing tolerable 
rules would not be easy. Part of the problem, to be sure, lay in differ-
ences in political and social viewpoints. But even people with similar 
views on broad questions found it hard to articulate their goals, to 
anticipate how families might behave, and to specify rules that achieved 
their goals in all (or even enough) of the situations in which families 
might find themselves. 
Another way of evaluating discretion's merits is to ask whether it 
enhances litigants' sense that justice has been done. Interestingly, a 
large number of practitioners reported that what their clients often 
seemed to want most was the opportunity to say their piece, to explain 
in their own terms why their marriage had ended and why they were 
entitled to what they claimed. These clients were anxious to believe that 
someone had listened to them, particularly on questions of marital fault. 
From this point of view, discretion is attractive because it may give the 
litigants more scope to appeal to a less-than-formal source of justice. 13 
IV. The Rewards of Rules 
I have been suggesting that, like other students of discretion, the 
conferees saw real strengths in the flexibility discretion offers family 
law. What, then, is to be said in favor of rules? Like other students of 
12. Id at 65. One form of discretion is created for its own sake and not because of 
difficulties in writing rules. This is what Max Weber called khadi justice. 
It is created where it is thought that decision-makers can be found who are wise, who 
understand the principles of justice, and who already know or are well placed to 
discover the relevant facts, sometimes through acquaintance with the parties or 
through personal enquiry of people who know them. 
Id at 61. King Solomon's celebrated child-custody decision is a classic example. How-
ever, this version of discretion is, in its pure form, foreign to our legal system. 
13. One lawyer reported that, in his experience, wise judges listened attentively 
while litigants had their say, even if that say had little to do with the court's rules of 
decision or with the considerations the judge would later rely on. 
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discretion, the conferees felt that a primary attraction of rules is that they 
conduce to ''efficiency.'' Rules reduce the possible range of decisions, 
thereby saving the time and tempers of courts, lawyers, and clients. 
And, as Whitehead deliciously observed, rules relieve us of the burden 
of working out afresh our solutions to recurring problems: 
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by 
eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the 
habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. 
Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations 
which we can perform without thinking about them. Operations of thought 
are like cavalry charges in a battle-they are strictly limited in number, they 
require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments. 14 
"Efficiency" is not a goal family law has historically valued. It is 
a cold virtue for so warm a subject. But several conferees proposed that 
efficiency is more desirable than we often think. They noted that most 
divorcing couples have little property to divide and no money to spare 
for legal fees. Even if they needed individualized justice (and some of 
the conferees believed that the problems of such couples were often not 
complex and regularly fell into identifiable patterns), they simply could 
not afford it. 
Efficiency is not the only goal rules are usually thought to serve well. 
The planning function is another. People need to know what the law 
says so that they can organize their lives rationally. Rules seem likelier 
than discretion to inform people what the law is and what courts will do. 
Rules are, after all, publicly stated and thus are, relatively, accessible to 
prospective litigants. And rules are precisely an attempt to state in 
advance how cases should be decided. 
In family law, the planning function may be relevant in two ways. 
First, people may want to know what the law is while they are married 
so that they can maximize their chances in any eventual divorce action. 
Second, people may want to understand the law when they are seeking 
a divorce so that they can "bargain in the shadow of the law." 15 The 
conferees asked how much families sought and used information about 
the law in each of those circumstances. 
The conferees were generally skeptical that many people were much 
interested in or affected by family law while they are married. This 
surely seems plausible. Most people doubt that they are the ones who 
14. Alfred North Whitehead, An Introduction to Mathematics 61 (H Holt and Co 
1911). 
15. This phrase, which was often deployed in our discussions, is from Robert H. 
Mnookin & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950 (1979). 
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will become divorce statistics. And most people are likelier to shape 
their behavior according to their own moral beliefs and to the social 
norms that surround them than to the more distant commands of the 
law. For that matter, most people don't know what the law of divorce 
is.I6 
Of course, all this could change when a husband and wife decide to 
divorce and know that, if they cannot resolve their differences, a court 
will do it for them. Nevertheless, the conferees pointed out that many 
spouses will still not be significantly affected by the law. First, in many 
cases the law's dictates will be irrelevant because the couple will not 
have disputes the law offers to solve. That is, many divorcing couples 
have neither property nor children to divide. 
Second, some couples will, despite incentives to the contrary, not 
know what the law is. Third, some couples will know what the law is, 
but believe the chances of actually going all the way through litigation 
are so slim that it is not worth taking the law into account. 17 Fourth, 
some-perhaps many-couples will know what the law is and believe 
that they may eventually have to go to court, but be more swayed by 
their personal preferences and their own moral and social codes than 
by the law. 18 
But there is a further wrinkle. Even if spouses engaged in bargaining 
know and respond to the law's commands, it is not plain that rules 
16. On this last point, see, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Con-
tract, 23 U Mich J L Reform 217, 236-3 7 ( 1990). For an extended examination of the 
general irrelevance of family law to most of family life, see Carl E. Schneider, Rethink-
ing Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L Rev 197, 203-09. 
One practitioner did report, however, having a client who decided several years in 
advance to seek a divorce and who consulted the practitioner for advice on how to 
behave during those years in order to maximize the chance of receiving custody of the 
couple's children. 
17. The usual estimate is that at least 90% of divorces are settled without litigation. 
A careful, thorough, and recent study (albeit one confined to California) by Eleanor 
E. Maccoby & Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas 
of Custody 159 (Harvard U Press, 1992), reports that only about 1.5% of the cases 
studied eventuated in a formal adjudication. This study also learned that three-quarters 
of the families investigated "experienced little if any conflict over the terms of the 
divorce decree." Id. 
18. Some interesting hints of the true complexity of these questions may be found 
in the study by Maccoby and Mnookin I cited in the preceding footnote. They report, 
for instance, that while the law's requirement that the non-custodial parent ordinarily 
have visitation rights and pay child support seems to have affected settlement 
agreements, it is far from clear that the law has had real effect on the larger question 
of which parent should receive custody. As to that question, ''family law may reflect 
and reinforce some tendencies, but its effects will be mainly at the margins, affecting 
mainly those cases in which the preexisting parental roles are unclear or in which 
parents are ambivalent about what they want." ld at 280. 
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announce those commands markedly better than discretion, at least (and 
of course this is a significant qualification) for those spouses who have 
lawyers. A number of practitioners confidently reported that they could 
predict with reasonable assurance what any single judge was likely to 
do. And a great many practitioners were basically convinced that they 
could accurately predict what their local bench in general would usually 
do. 19 
As I have been reporting, the conferees broadly agreed that rules 
generally serve law's efficiency and planning functions better than dis-
cretion. They were also alert to another way in which rules might be 
preferable to discretion in family law. They frequently remarked that 
rules often promote better than discretion law's "expressive" function. 
The expressive function is mobilized when the law is used to make 
statements that have symbolic importance. 20 
The law of child custody provides several illuminating examples of 
the use and usefulness of the law's expressive function. Several of the 
conferees remarked that women continue to receive custody in a notably 
high proportion of the cases no matter what legal rule purports to govern 
custody decisions. Why then do so many people continue to be exercised 
about custody rules? Partly, these conferees contended, because those 
rules have symbolic resonances that matter to people and that may even 
shape thinking and behavior. For instance, some of the conferees saw 
the primary-custodian rule as making a valuable statement about the 
legitimacy of women's claims to custody. Others saw that rule as a way 
of telling fathers as a class to get lost. Even the best-interest standard 
can be understood as a social affirmation that the concerns of children 
are overridingly important. 21 
Finally some conferees saw a virtue in rules where other conferees 
had seen a virtue in discretion. These conferees argued that rules could 
19. Even this interesting point does not fully end the list of relevant considerations. 
The standard "law and economics" view is that certain rules promote settlements, 
since such rules should give one party a powerful tool for exacting agreement from the 
other. On the other hand, several lawyers at the conference reached the opposite 
conclusion. They believed that litigants are driven by uncertain rules to finding some 
mutual accommodation rather than trusting to the uncertain preferences of an unpredict-
able court. It might also be said that, the more uncertain the law, the more room the 
parties have to negotiate the agreement that comes closest to reflecting their own 
preferences and standards. 
20. On the expressive function in family law, see Mary Ann Glendon, Abonion and 
Divorce in Western Law (Harvard U Press, 1987); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing 
Parenthood, 98 Yale L I 293 (1988); and Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions 
of Family Law, 22 UC DAVIS L REv 991 (1989). On the functions of family law 
generally, see Carl E. Schneider, Family Law (West Publishing, forthcoming). 
21. Similarly, a number of conferees saw the presumption that marital property 
should be divided equally as a social pronouncement on the moral basis of marriage. 
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enhance litigants' satisfaction (or, more accurately, reduce their dis sat-
isfaction) better than discretion. Litigants may feel that a decision based 
observably on rules is at least not arbitrary and discriminatory. As 
one lawyer commended, "Clients want to be treated the same way as 
everybody else." Rules make even-handedness easier to demonstrate 
and to perceive. 
Along these lines, several lawyers commented that rules helped them 
in their relations with their clients. As one lawyer observed, "Some-
times clients have very unreasonable expectations, and clear rules help 
control them.'' (''Control'' here meant guiding the client toward claims 
that stood some chance of success and toward the hope of settling 
the dispute on reasonable terms.) Ultimately, however, the conferees 
ruefully acknowledged that few losing litigants can summon up the 
detachment to be happy with their encounter with the law. 
These observations about how rules can promote the satisfaction of 
litigants could be expanded to make a more general point. Rules may 
serve better than discretion the goal of treating like cases alike. If each 
decision-maker has discretion to decide case by case what principles to 
apply and how to apply them, cases that are essentially similar are likely 
to be decided differently. Rules, on the other hand, work to suppress 
differences of opinion among decision-makers. Furthermore, rules 
serve as record-keeping devices, so that decision-makers can more 
easily coordinate their rulings over time and among themselves. 
However, there is a counter-argument. It might be said that the 
problem with rules is exactly that they work by establishing large cate-
gories in which a range offactual situations is subsumed. Even though 
a group of cases fits under a single rule, there will usually be some 
differences among them. In other words, rules lump cases together 
which are not identical, and in this way rules seem to ensure that like 
cases will not be decided alike. There is a solution to this failing of 
rules, of course. It is to write rules as narrowly as possible. But the 
more narrowly a rule is written, the more difficult it becomes to write 
and the more rigid it becomes to apply. 
V. Why is Discretion Tolerable? 
Both lawyers and the laity conventionally regard law as a system of 
rules. The drawbacks and dangers of discretion are well-known and 
often recited. Yet discretion pervades law. Legislators and the executive 
exercise the authority they receive from ''the people'' in dramatically 
discretionary ways. Administrators high and low command wide swaths 
of discretion in deciding how their agencies should perform the tasks 
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they are assigned. Judges wield all the kinds of discretion we have 
already charted, and more besides. Jurors exercise their fact-finding 
authority almost without formal supervision. And not just the litigants, 
but also their lawyers, make discretionary decisions that are far from 
trivial. 
What, if anything, makes all this discretion tolerable? The conferees 
talked interestingly about one little-remarked but basic factor that speaks 
directly to the tolerability and desirability of discretion-the ability and 
reliability of judges. As Professor Cooper sensibly wrote in considering 
discretion and interlocutory appeals: 
The nature and quality of the federal district judges is the single most im-
portant factor to be counted. The better the judges are, the less need there 
is for frequent interlocutory appeal-they will make fewer mistakes, and 
more often correct their own mistakes before serious harm is done .... To 
the extent that we do not trust trial judges, on the other hand, we will be 
driven to rely more on clear rules or on discretionary devices that are 
controlled by the courts of appeals.22 
In short, we want good judges to have discretion, but not bad ones. 
A bad rule can do more harm than a single bad judge. A crucial question, 
then, is how many bad judges there are. Most intriguingly, a truly 
substantial number of conferees said that the judges who decide family 
law cases are, as a whole, competent and conscientious, although not 
brilliant.23 Several conferees calculated that they had only had to deal 
with one really incompetent judge at any one time or even over the 
course of their careers. 
Not everyone concurred in this (rather temperate) praise of the bench. 
A few conferees dissented, and some others said that judicial "bias" 
could influence judicial decisions. But it was not clear what the nature, 
depth, or perils of those biases were, and they did not loom large in our 
discussions. 
The conferees identified another reason that discretion is tolerable. 
They observed (as I remarked earlier) that pure discretion is actually 
rare. As Justice Cardozo wrote, 
Complete freedom-unfettered and undirected-there never is. A thousand 
limitations-the product some of statute, some of precedent, some of vague 
22. Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, 
47 Law & Contemporary Problems 157, 158-59 (1984). 
23. As one conferee frankly put it, "Our judges aren't great, but they're competent. 
They are the C students, not the best and the brightest.'' In this respect, it is noteworthy 
that one conferee reported that judges were more likely to go astray on financial rather 
than child-custody issues, since while the latter cases were emotionally difficult, the 
former could be so complex and abstruse that judges would badly misunderstand the 
issues they faced. 
242 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 27, Number 2, Summer 1993 
tradition or of an immemorial technique-encompass and hedge us even 
when we think of ourselves as ranging freely and at large .... Narrow at 
best is any freedom that is allotted to us. 24 
But what are these ''thousand limitations''? The conferees were spe-
cially interested in one such limitation that is notable but too little 
noticed: Judges tend to curtail their own discretion. This tendency has 
several practical sources. 
Efficiency and fairness concerns, simple laziness, a wish to avoid responsi-
bility, and even a desire to escape the boredom of constantly repeating the 
reasoning necessary to decide a case can drive decision-makers toward 
relying on their own earlier decisions in factually similar cases rather than 
embarking on fresh discretionary frolics. 25 
Thus a number of conferees reported that judges frequently devised and 
deployed their own rules of thumb and that such rules of thumb could 
become quite well known and even be formalized. There was even some 
feeling that, far from searching for ways of expanding their discretion-
ary authority, judges sometimes apply case-law or statutory rules me-
chanically and uncritically, treating them as easy ways out of hard 
decisions. 
Another means by which judges foreswear the discretion they might 
exercise is by deferring to the parties and the witnesses. Most judges 
are more than eager to persuade litigants to relieve the court of the entire 
burden of decision by settling their dispute out of court. Similarly, some 
conferees felt that judges sometimes deferred more than generously in 
child-custody disputes to the preferences of guardians ad litem, the 
recommendations of social workers, and the pronouncements of psy-
chologists. 26 
Furthermore, a multitude of other pressures crowd around the judge 
and cabin judicial discretion. Those who appoint or select judges may 
seek to limit judicial discretion by choosing judges who seem likely to 
behave in desirable ways. Judges are generally socialized in the society 
in which they work, and they have commonly internalized many of its 
values (including the value of not abusing discretion). Judges have 
undergone training designed to teach them to ''think like a lawyer,'' 
and thus to reject some kinds of judicial choices as unthinkable. And 
24. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 61 (Yale U Press 1924). 
25. Schneider, Discretion and Rules cited in note 6 at 82. For a first-rate description 
of this tendency, see Richard Lempert, Discretion in a Behavioral Perspective: The 
Case of a Public Housing Eviction Board, in Keith Hawkins, ed., The Uses of Discretion 
(Oxford U Press, 1992). 
26. For carefully documented insights into this tendency, see Robert J. Levy, Cus-
tody Investigations as Evidence in Divorce Cases, 21 Family L Q 149 (1987). 
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the lessons of law school are often elaborated and reinforced by long 
apprenticeships in the practice of law. 
In addition, judges are subject to criticism from their local bar, from 
their colleagues on the bench, and even from their friends and families. 
Judges may be reversed if they misuse their discretion (an experience 
judges tend to find disagreeable). In some jurisdictions, joint commit-
tees of lawyers and judges or surveys conducted by bar associations 
provide forums in which the conduct of judges may be scrutinized. If 
judges continually behave improperly, they are (ultimately, in princi-
ple) subject to discipline and even removal. And the conferees pointed 
with particular approval to another limitation on judicial power: Judges 
must follow procedural rules which limit what a judge hears, what a 
judge can do, and when a judge can act. 
One measure of the success of this host of confining forces is a fact 
I mentioned before. A large number of practitioners were confident that 
they could ordinarily predict how a judge would decide a case. This 
suggests not only that judges were limited by the thousand constraints 
surrounding them, but that they were limited in regularized, systematic 
ways. It is, in short, the concerted pressure of these constraints that 
makes discretion tolerable. 
VI. Some Concluding Observations 
We may briefly summarize the conference's thinking about the ten-
sion in family law between discretion and rules in this way. The confer-
ees concluded that legal systems characteristically do not offer a choice 
between discretion and rules, but rather develop for each substantive 
area a mix of discretion and rules that falls somewhere along a contin-
uum. They believed that that mix was dynamic, that it would change 
according to the dynamics of the common law process and the devel-
oping attitudes and customs of the jurisdiction. 
The conferees tended to think that the subjects family law regulates 
are too multitudinous and multifarious to be satisfactorily reduced to 
flat rules. But the conferees were simultaneously drawn to the efficiency 
of rules and to their claims to serve the planning and expressive functions 
better than discretion. 
The conferees well understood some of the forces that limit the discre-
tionary authority with which the family law judge seems so well en-
dowed. They fully grasped that judges often seek to limit their own 
powers by devising rules of thumb and by deferring to litigants and 
experts. They perceived that judges are further inhibited by their social-
ization, their professional training, the criticism to which they are sub-
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ject, the institutional setting in which they must work, and by the proce-
dural and substantive commands they must follow. 
Most basically, I think, the conferees knew that the proper mix of 
discretion and rules in any given area of law cannot be determined a 
priori. The advantages and disadvantages of both discretion and rules 
are numerous and interrelated in wickedly complex ways. All will 
depend, then, on who the judges are, who the litigants are, what the 
subject for decision is, and what political, social, economic, and legal 
forces impinge on the decision. 
All this, I think, fairly describes how the conferees analyzed the 
questions placed before them. But it does not fully reflect all the con-
cerns about discretion and rules in family law that many of the conferees 
felt, and felt intensely. Let me close by sketching the most prominent 
and penetrating of those concerns. 
A number of the conferees felt that we are seeing a momentous 
development in family law. As the rate of divorce has climbed to its 
present height, as the population has become richer and thus better able 
to buy legal services, and as a larger view of what constitutes a legal 
problem has taken hold, the demand on family law for its services 
has grown impressively. When an institution must provide extensive, 
elaborate, and difficult services to multitudes of people, it quickly dis-
covers that it is on the way toward becoming a bureaucracy. 
Many of the conferees were afraid that we today are witnessing the 
bureaucratization of family law. They saw the recent federal require-
ment that states adopt child-support guidelines as a telling step in that 
direction. They believed that that bureaucratization was being hastened 
along by another trend-the federalization of family law. Federal child-
support legislation is one example of this trend; federal responses to the 
problem of child abuse are another. The conferees feared that, the more 
family law responds to central commands, the more bureaucratic it must 
become. 
The bureaucratization of family law, of course, has deep and exten-
sive consequences for the balance between rules and discretion. The 
essential question of bureaucratic organization is how to control and 
make consistent the similar decisions of legions of parallel decision-
makers. The standard answer to that question is to impose rules of an 
effectively binding sort on those decision-makers-to deprive them of 
their discretion. 
Some conferees certainly appreciated the advantages of the bureau-
cratization of family law. A number of people asked whether we can 
afford to offer individualized justice in an area where the demand for 
it is great, its cost is overwhelming, and its success is questionable. 
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Nevertheless, the movement toward bureaucratization disturbed some 
of the conferees acutely. 
The conferees who were concerned about the trend toward bureaucra-
tization worried about what such a routinization of family law could 
mean for them professionally. They feared that judges deprived of 
discretion could hardly be distinguished from computers and that law-
yers who argued to such judges could hardly be more than low-level 
data processors. 
But these conferees also saw the trend as frustrating their clients in the 
way bureaucracies frustrate everyone-by being elaborately rule-bound 
and unable to respond to the individual circumstances of real people. 
"But we're supposed to be lawyers looking for justice," protested one 
conferee. And we all wondered how far this might be possible in the 
new world we face. 
